Duties to Oneself and Third-Party Blame, Public Affairs Quarterly (forthcoming)
A number of viable ethical theories allow for the possibility of duties to oneself. If such duties exist, then, at least sometimes, by treating ourselves badly, we wrong ourselves and could rightly be held responsible, by ourselves and by non-affected third parties, for doing so. Yet, while we blame those who wrong others, we do not tend to, nor do we think ourselves entitled to blame people who treat themselves badly. If we try, they might justifiably respond that it is none of our business. This disanalogy might be thought of as a reason for skepticism about duties to oneself. It allegedly indicates that self-inflicted harm, while irrational, is not immoral. In this paper, I argue that this disanalogy is deceptive. First, it relies on the unjustified assumption that our response to someone treating herself badly consists solely in a judgment that she is being irrational or foolish, which is incompatible with leading views about what constitutes blame. Second, the objection fails to recognize that third-party blame is positional: in some contexts, it is inappropriate for a third party to express blame just because of her position as a third party.
Second-Person Standpoint and Duties to Oneself (in progress)
I critically examine the idea that a successful account of duties to oneself is diachronic, that is, the one that appeals to temporal slices within a person's life. This idea presents an attempt to conceive of duties to oneself within second-person standpoint moral framework, according to which moral duties are irreducibly second-personal. That is, they arise as a result of a legitimate address of a claim. Thus, according to the second-personal account of duties to oneself, one has a duty to oneself to phi if a hypothetical justified claim is issued from one perspective occupied at time t to another perspective at time t'.
On the Alleged Incoherence of Duties to Oneself (submitted)
I explore the familiar argument according to which the idea of duties owed to oneself is deeply problematic since, if such duties existed, we could release ourselves from them at our discretion. One can be easily misled into taking the challenge presented by this argument to be less significant than it is: the generally cited case for it [based on Hohfeldian system of correlation between rights and duties] is unconvincing and has a number of weaknesses discussed in the literature. I contend, nevertheless, that a good reason exists for re-opening the debate on the alleged incoherence of duties to oneself.